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Abstract
I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 and during
1998-2002. My results suggest that retired CEOs became more popular on boards.
Also, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of
outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample as Brickley, Linck
and Coles (1999) found, it does not in the 1998-2002 sample. Third, a companys
stock performance during a CEOs tenure a¤ects whether he became an inside dir-
ector of that company after retirement. A 25% change in stock price performance
increased the probability by 11% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 51% in the 1998-2002
sample. Finally, if a retired CEO worked in a regulated industry, his probability of
serving at least one outside directorship fell by 34% in the 1989-1993 sample, and
24% in the 1998-2002 sample.
JEL Classication: G34, G38, L10, L51
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1 Introduction
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) and Holmstrom (2005) point out that the enormous in-
crease in equity-based payment and shareholder activism are two notable changes in U.S.
corporate governance over the past 20 years. Linck, Netter and Yang (2006a) show that
the structure of boards has changed, too. This trend is in response to both internal and
external environment which include globalization, shareholder activisim, and corporate
scandals. The size of boards declined from the early 1990s to the late 1990s but this
trend shows a break after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed. The proportion of outside
directors on boards increased over the last 15 years.
The goal of this paper is to study what has happened over time to the selection of
retired CEOs as board members. For that purpose, I revisit Brickley, Linck and Coles
(1999). They identify 277 retired CEOs from U.S rms during 1989-1993 and analyze the
directorships they serve after retirement1. First of all, I construct a more recent sample
following their method to look at what changed. I compare the two samples, as well.
I nd that retired CEOs became more popular on boards. The percentage of retired
CEOs who hold at least one board directorship (inside or outside) 2 years after retirement
in the full sample increased from 75.1% in 1989-1993 to 94.4% in 1998-2002. The cause
is the increase in the number of outside directorships to be lled. The average number of
directorships retired CEOs hold has also increased signicantly from 1.8 to 2.53, which
implies that the total number of retired CEOs on boards has risen23.
The second nding is that pre-retirement accounting performance explains the num-
1The main contributions of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) are that (1) they provide evidence on
a previously unidentied source of manageral incentives (2) they suggest that rms consider ability
in choosing board members. The quality of CEO has positive e¤ects on the probability of serving
directorships after retirement. They also explore other factors (rm size, regulation and so on) to have
e¤ects on the selection of board members.
2 It is hard to discuss the change in the proportion of retired CEOs on boards. Lehn, Patro and Zhao
(2004) show evidence that mean board size has declined in 1990s. Mulherin (2005) also shows that the
average number of directors has a downward trend. Linck, Netter and Yang (2006a) , however, provide
di¤erent evidence for the size of board. They show that there is a general decline in board size from the
early 1990s to the late 1990s, but it begins to rise at 2002, especially in large rms. Their data conrms
that the average size of board during 2000-2004 is smaller than that during 1991-1995 in large rms,
which is exactly overlapped with my time frame. However, if we also take into account middle- and
small-sized rms, we cannot conclude that the currnet board size is smaller than that during 1989-1993.
3 In a slightly di¤erent angle, Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) provide evidence that the
mean number of directorships held by outside directors (current CEO, retired CEO, lawyer, professor
and so on) is 1.89 based on 1995 board data sets. The average number of directorships (inside or outside)
retired CEOs who have at least one outside directorship hold is 3.03 during 1998-2002, compared to 2.8
during 1989-1993 . We can conjecture that retired CEOs tend to have more directorships than mean
level of directorships held by outside directors.
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ber of outside directorships CEOs hold two years after retirement in the 1989-1993 sample
well. In contrast, it has no explanatory power in the 1998-2002 sample. A 5.6% increase
in accounting performance produces a 7% increase in the probability of holding at least
one outside directorship after retirement in the 1989-1993 sample. It is, however, not
signicantly correlated with the number of outside directorships in the 1998-2002 sample.
Third, the stock price performance (abnormal stock return) of his company while he
was a CEO a¤ects whether an ex-CEO becomes a chairman or insider director on his own
board after he retires, especially in the 1998-2002 sample. If the stock price performance
increases by 25%, the probability that CEO will serve as a chairman or inside director
during 1998-2002 goes up by 51%, compared to 11.4% during 1989-1993. This nding
is consistent with Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003). They point out that "CEO pay to
market-performance sensitivity" has risen more than tenfold from 1980-1999 due to the
increase in equity-based compensation. Since the retention of CEOs on their own boards
is an implict incentive to mitigate horizon problems, this trend (the increase in "pay to
market performance" sensitivity) could show up here.
Finally, both samples share the common feature that if retired CEOsoriginal rms
are regulated (utility, depository institution and insurance), the probability of their
serving as outside directors decreases, though this negative e¤ect has been declining over
time. If retired CEOs worked in regulated industries, their probability of serving at least
one outside directorship 2 years after retirement falls by 34.1% in the 1989-1993 sample,
compared to 24% in the 1998-2002 sample. Moreover, retired CEOs from regulated
sectors have signicantly more directorships during 1998-2002 time period than those
in the 1989-1993 sample. For instance, retired CEOs from regulated sectors hold 1.89
outside directorships during 1998-2002, compared to 0.73 during 1989-1993. Brickley,
Linck and Coles (1999) argue that the reason why retirees from regulated sectors tend
to have less outside directorships is that regulated sectors are less visible or the retirees
accumulate human capital which is less related to competitive markets. Following this
logic, the deregulation of regulated sectors might explain the increasing directorships for
CEOs from regulated industries4. Many studies compare the governance structure before
4The regulated sectors, especially the utilities, nancial, and insurance sectors, have experienced a
deregulation process which was designed toward more competitive markets. In the utility sector, the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 was passed on October 1992 to delegate the power to increase competition
in the transmission and generation of electricity. Two major FERC ruling took place in 1993 and 1996.
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and after the deregulation process. Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995) show a signic-
ant increase in pay-performance sensitivities from a sample of the regulated period to a
sample of the deregulated period in U.S. bank industries. Palia (2000) studies the intial
entry of CEOs into the market and nds that lowerly educated CEOs are slotted into
utility (regulated) sectors, while airlines have highly qualied CEOs after deregulations.
Cunat and Guadalupe (2003) nd that the total pay of executives increases according
to a degree of product market competiton by exploring the deregulation stories in bank
and nancial sectors. Denitely, we can hypothesize that we continue to experience the
e¤ect of deregulation because currently, the market would be more likely to recognize
retired CEOs from regulated industries as more talented candidates for board members
than CEOs who worked in regulated industries before deregulations.
As for the rst nding, there are four potential explanations why retired CEOs be-
came more common on boards. First, the total size of outside directors might have been
increased. Second, rms begin to strongly prefer retired CEOs as independent board
members because retired CEOs have enough skills and experience to advise executives.
Holmstrom (2005) describes the reason why current CEOs and retired CEOs serve other
rmsboard. They are more knowledged to understand the rms strategy and inform-
ation. In this sense, more uncertain managerial environments due to the globalization
and mergers could increase the demand for retired CEOs as directors to invite better
advice for the management. The organizational complexity of rms due to globaliza-
tion (diversication) and mergers over the past twenty years could make retired CEOs
more attractive as board members because they may have greater knowledge about the
management, organization of rms, or about the global managerial environment, making
them optimal choices for better monitoring. Third, shareholder activism mainly critcizes
multiple directorships of directors with full time jobs (current CEO, lawyer, professor
and so on), making it hard to hire qualied directors with full time jobs, which im-
plies that retired CEOs without full time jobs become more popular in the market for
outside directors. Finally, since the amount of work assigned to board members might
have been increased, other candidates for outside directors with full time jobs have less
In nancial sectors, the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching E¢ ciency Act allows all
commercial banks to operate branches across states, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA, 1999)
eliminates barriers among banking, insurance, and securities underwriting.
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time to devote as a board member. It could be the case that Institutional Investors act-
ively communicate with executives and board members to put a great deal of pressure
on boards. Alternatively, increased work burden could come from corporate scandals.
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increases the re-
sponsibility of managers and board members. Subsequently, it increases the workload
and risk of boards. Linck, Netter and Yang (2006b) nd evidence that after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, rms pay more directors fees, which is consistent with the theory that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act places large burdens on boards. My data sets cover retired CEOs
during 1998-2002, and I focus on the number of directorships 2 years after retirement,
so my time frame partially overlaps with the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002).
2 Sample design and comparison
2.1 Sample selection
I identify retired CEOs by reviewing the S&P Compustat. I download a CEO list of
approximately the 500 largest rms in the U.S in terms of sales, assets and market value
on 1997 year base. Then I sort CEOs who left CEO positions during 1998-2002. Through
this process we identify CEOs who potentially retired. I eliminate CEO departures
that occur (1) around bankruptcies, going-private transactions, and other reasons where
public infromation is not avalable, and (2) due to death. I thus identify 250 CEOs
who left the o¢ ce during 1998-2002. For comparision, I briey describe the sample
selection in Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) (hereafter, "the old data set or "the 1989-
1993 sample"). They identify retired CEOs by reviewing the Forbes annual executive
compensation surveys, which contain approximately 800 CEOs with the 500 largest U.S
companies. Through this process, they identify 315 CEOs who potentially retired. They
also eliminate CEO departure following criteria (1) and (2) above. Finally, they have
277 CEOs who left o¢ ce during 1989-1993.
Table 1 shows the distribution by industry, as classied by Standard Industrial Clas-
sication (SIC ) codes from the Compustat data base. The number of observations (N )
represents the number of rms at which CEOs worked before retirement in each industry.
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The distribution of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)s data set5 (the 1989-1993 sample)
is in parenthesis.6 My data set (hereafter, "the current data set" or "the 1998-2002
sample") contains many more service industries (SIC code 73 ) and many fewer utilities
(SIC code 49 ), depository institutions (SIC code 60 ) than Brickley, Linck and Coles
(1999)s data (the 1989-1993 sample).
2.2 Performance and other data
I collect the accounting information from the S&P Compustat and stock returns from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I dene pre-retirement performance
as the CEOs total tenure or his last four years in o¢ ce, whichever is less. Brickley,
Linck and Coles (1999) acquire accounting and stock information by similar methods.
The primary reason to stress the most recent four-year performance period is to com-
pare my outcome to that of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999). I use return on asset
(ROA), industry-adjusted ROA, and abnormal stock returns as measures of performance.
Industry-adjusted ROA is the average annual return on assets, net of the median return7
on assets for all rms in the industry including sample rms8. The abnormal stock return
is the compound average annual stock return minus the CRSP value-weighted index.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of CEO and characteristics for the rm at
which the CEO worked before retirement. Following Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999),
I divide the 1998-2002 sample into two sub-samples. The rst sub-sample (Age = 60 )
includes CEOs who retired at the age of 60 and older. The second sub-sample (64 5 Age
566 ) covers CEOs who left their position between aged 64 and 66. Both sub-samples
are classied as normal retirement age. A di¤erence-in-mean test shows that only in the
1989-1993 sample, is ROA signicantly higher for the normal retirement age group.
The descriptive statistics by tenure as a CEO are reported in Table 3. While 82
CEOs (29.6% in the full sample) have tenure of less than 5 years during 1989-1993, only
5James Linck provides Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)s full dataset, so that I can show descriptive
statistics and estimates not present in Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) using their original data set.
6Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) obtains SIC codes from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) tapes. Since there are di¤erences between SIC codes on Compustat and CRSP I re-classify
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)s data set based on SIC codes of Compustat for the consistency between
two samples.
7While Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) compute the median industry return based on 2-digit CRSP
SIC code, I did it based on 2-digit SIC code from Compustat.
8When Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) compute the median return they exclude the sample rm.
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32 CEOs (13.01%) stay in o¢ ce less than 5 years in the 1998-2002 sample. The old data
set contains 103 CEOs (37.18%) who work at least 10 years, compared to 127 CEOs
(51.63%) in the current data set9. In other words, more than half of retired CEOs have
at least 10 years tenure10 in the 1998-2002 sample.11
2.3 Directorship data
While Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) gather information from the Compact Disclosure
(D/SEC) CD-Rom per year from 1990-1996 and Standard and Poors register of directors
and executive directors to identify the number of post-retirement director positions held
by retired CEOs, I use the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lings and Forbes
website. To determine positions, I search each rms proxy statement (ling form: DEF
14A). Based on the proxy statement, I calculate board positions held in +2 years, where
+2 years represents the second year after CEOs retire.
Table 4-A shows that the percentage of CEOs who serve at least one board director-
ship 2 years after retirement in the full sample has increased from 75.1% in 1989-1993 to
94.4% in 1998-2002 (See Total +2 years > 0 in Table 4-A). Also, the percentage of CEOs
who serve at least one outside directorship in the full sample has increased from 58.1%
to 78% (See Outside + 2 years > 0 in Table 4-A). As Table 4-B shows, the average
number of directorships retired CEOs hold has increased signicantly (Total + 2 years,
from 1.8 to 2.52 directorships), which is mostly driven by the increase in the number of
outside directorships (Outside + 2 years, from 1.3 to 2.08 ).
3 The selection of outside directors
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) show that the accounting performance (ROA and
industry-adjusted ROA) has an economically signicant e¤ect on the number of out-
9One might conjecture that the takeover boom of the 1980s could explain the shorter tenure of retired
CEOs during 1989-1993. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), however, show that the takeover activity in the
late 1990s is very high.
10Hudson and Starks (2001) present evidence on CEO turnover decisions from 1971 to 1994 and show
that the incidence of forced turnover is the highest durning 1989-1994. However, there is no data as to
whether this increased turnover continued or not. In addition, the distribution of retired CEOsage is
very similar between the two time frames, so it is hard to say that the shorter tenure during 1989-1993
could be due to frequent forced turnovers.
11This nding is not consistent with the prediction of Hermalin (2005). He predicts that CEOstenure
would be shorter due to the current trend in corporate governance, a greater board diligence.
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side board seats in 1989-1993.12 My result contradicts this nding for 1998-2002. Table
5 provides the estimate of ordered logit models. The dependent variable takes on the
value 0,1,2,3,4 which means the number of outside directorships CEOs hold two years
after retirement. If an executive has more than 4 directorships, the value 4 is assigned.
The explanatory variables are the performance over the four years before retirement, the
natural logarithm of total assets, and a regulation dummy which equals one if the rm is
a utility, depository institution or insurance company13. The outcome of the 1989-1993
sample is in parenthesis. In this setup, there is no di¤erence between Brickley, Linck and
Coles (1999) and my regression except for the time period. The estimated coe¢ cients on
Return on asset14 and Industry adjusted ROA are insignicant and on Abnormal stock
return is signicantly negative in the 1998-2002 sample. This implies that accounting
performance15 does not have an e¤ect on the number of outside board seats, and stock
price performance (abnormal stock return) has a negative e¤ect. Firm size (LnAsset)
and the regulation dummy (Regulated dummy) have similar e¤ects in both samples. The
number of outside directorships is highly correlated with the size of the rm at which the
CEO had worked before retirement. The number of outside directorships decreases when
the CEOs original rm is regulated. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) conjecture that
regulated rms are less visible than unregulated rms, or that the CEO in the typical
regulated company has human capital less related to competitive markets.
12Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)s potential explanation for the strong relationship between the
accounting returns and the number of outside directorships is for the following: "there are at least
two reasons why a superior CEOs ability might be reected in superior accounting returns. First, if
the CEOs skills are specic to the rm, the rm might share in the di¤erence between CEOs value
to the rm and his second highest-valued use. Second, accounting numbers do not reect all a rms
compensation cost....Therefore, if rms want CEOs with known high ability as outside directors, the
likelihood of being asked to serve on another rms board is more likely to be correlated with ROA over
the nal four years than with abnormal stock returns." (Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999), page 371)
13As I mentioned before, while I obtain SIC codes in 1998-2002 samples from Compustat, Brickley,
Linck and Coles (1999) use in 1989-1993 samples from CRSP. To make the category of regulated sectors
be consistent between two data sets I classify utility, depository institution, and insurance rms on both
samples as regulated rms and this classication is based on SIC code of Compustat. SIC codes are 49
(utility), 60 (depository institution), and 63 (insurance). Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) classify utility
(SIC code 49 on CRSP), bank (SIC code 6023, 6025 on CRSP), and insurance (SIC code 63 on CRSP)
as regulated sectors in their paper.
14Table 6 presents that the estimated coe¢ cient on Return on asset in the 1989-1993 sample is signic-
antly positive. I run the regression excluding the retired CEOs who hold 4 or more outside directorships
in the 1989-1993 sample. It shows that the coe¢ cient on Return on asset is not signicant, which implies
that the e¤ect of pre-retirement accounting performance is mostly driven by retired CEOs who hold 4
or more outside directorships. The number of retired CEOs who hold 4 or more is 27 out of 277 retired
CEOs in the 1989-1993 sample.
15 I also utilize Return on Equity (ROE) as an explanatory variable. ROE does not have any explanatory
power for the number of outside directorships, either.
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Next, I compare the size of the e¤ect. A 5.6% increase in return on assets (the
standard deviation), taking all other variables at their means, produces a 7% increase
in the probability of holding at least one outside directorship after retirement in the
1989-1993 sample. There, however, does not exist a signicant correlation between the
two variables in the 1998-2002 sample. If the log of assets increases by 1.28 (its standard
deviation), the probability that a CEO will serve one or more outside directorships during
1989-1993 increases by 18.82%, compared to 11.6% during 1989-1993. However, if the log
of assets goes up by the same amount, the probability that a CEO will serve three or more
outside directorships during 1989-1993 rises by 10.75%, compared to 17.28% during 1998-
2002. Finally, consider the regulation dummy. Working in regulated industries decreases
their probability of serving at least one outside directorship by 34% in the 1989-1993
sample, compared to 34% in the 1998-2002 sample.
3.1 The deregulation e¤ect
I start by reconsidering regulated sector-specic e¤ects. Table 6 porvides evidence on
the mean di¤erence in total number of outside directorships retired CEOs hold 2 years
after retirement, pre-retire performance, assets and CEO tenure between regulated and
non regulated sectors in both the 1989-1993 sample and the 1998-2002 sample. The
di¤erence-in-mean test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggest that the mean di¤erence
in the number of outside directorship between regulated and non-regulated sectors is
signicant only in the 1989-1993 sample, but the mean di¤erence in Return on asset
between regulated sectors and non-regulated sectors is signicant in both samples1617.
Here, we can nd an another noticeable change between the two time periods. The
number of outside directorships of CEOs who worked in regulated industries has increased
signicantly (See Total Outside +2 years in Table 7-A)18. Retired CEOs from regulated
16The mean di¤erence in ROA between regulated sectors and non-regulated sectors is mostly driven by
the di¤erence between depository institution and complements. The reason why depository institutions
have lower ROA is that loans of bank are classied as an asset, so that depository institutions tend to
have the larger rm size (total value of assets) than non-depository institutions.
17There does not exist a signicant mean di¤erence in the total number of outside directorships
between depository institution (insurance) and non-depository institution (non insurance) in the 1998-
2002 sample. During 1989-1993, CEOs who retired from depository institution and insurance industry
have signicantly lower outside directorships than those of complements, which is not consistent with
the 1998-2002 sample
18As I mentioned before, the average number of outside directorships retired CEOs hold has increased
signicantly over time. This signicant increase is mainly driven by regulated sectors.
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sectors hold 1.89 outside directorships in the 1998-2002 sample, compared to 0.73 in
the 1989-1993 sample. It can be easily seen that an increase in the number of outside
directorships is evenly due to an increase in "Utility" (Outside +2 years, from 0.89
to 2.2), "depository institution" (Outside +2 years, from 0.66 to 1.71) and "insurance
industry" (Outside +2 years, from 0.63 to 1.93). To provide more evidence, I test the
mean di¤ernce in nancial sectors between the two time periods. Both the di¤erence-
in-mean test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test conrm a deregulation e¤ect (See Outside
+2 years in Table 7-B).
Table 8 presents the ordered logit model which includes the industry dummy19. If
retired CEOs worked as CEOs in the utility industry their probability of holding at
least one outside directorship decreases by 21% in the 1989-1993 sample. However, I
cannot nd such a regulation e¤ect in utility sectors during 1998-2002. The insurance
industry also has experienced deregulations. The working experience in the insurance
industry decreases their probability of holding outside directorships by 21% in the 1998-
2002 sample, which is lower than the 37.5% in the 1989-1993 sample. Working for a
depository institution has a similar e¤ect in both samples. In the 1998-2002 sample, if
retired CEOs worked as a CEO in depository institutions their probability of holding
outside directorships declines by 39.2%, similar to the 37.8% in the 1989-1993 sample.
4 Chairman/inside director
In this section, I explore factors which a¤ect the probability of retired CEOs serving on
their own boards 2 years after leaving o¢ ce. Table 9 presents the mean pre-retirement
performance and rm size at which CEO worked before retirement by whether a CEO
has a chairman/inside directorship or not. The pre-retirement performance measured
by abnormal stock return is signicantly better for CEOs who hold a chairman/inside
directorship during both time periods. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test, however, suggests
that pre-retirement return on asset averaged over CEOs who have a chairman or insider
directorship is signicantly higher than pre-retirement return on asset of complement
19The negative coe¢ cient of the regulation dummy in Table 6 is mainly originated from depository
institutions and insurance sectors during both time periods. The nancial industry dummy on specic-
ation (1) mainly captures the e¤ect of depository institution and insurance. Specication (2) in Table 9
seperately shows the e¤ect of both industries.
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only during 1989-1993.
Table 10 shows the main outcome of the logit estimation. Abnormal stock return
explains the probability of a CEOs serving as chairman or insider director on his own
board very well, which is similar to Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999).20 However, the
size of the e¤ect is much larger during 1998-2002. The length of the tenure as a CEO
has a signicantly positive e¤ect during both time periods. Brickley, Linck and Coles
(1999) argue that this outcome is consistent with the theory that the longer tenure is
related with better performance and more CEO power. The di¤erence in the size of the
e¤ect between two samples is interesting. If the stock price performance rises by 25%
(its standard deviation), taking all other variables at their means, the probability that
a CEO will serve as a chairman or inside director during 1989-1993 increases by 11.4%,
compared to only 51% during 1998-2002. This nding is consistent with Holmstrom
and Kaplan (2003). They point out that "CEO pay to market-performance sensitivity"
has increased by more than ten fold from 1980-1999 due to the increase in equity-based
compensations. Since the retention of a CEO on his own board is an implicit incentive,
this trend could show up here.
5 The Cross E¤ect
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) already pointed out that there may be a "cross e¤ect".
A retired CEO who serves as outside director on other boards would be less likely to work
as a chairman or inside director on his own board. To test the cross e¤ect, let us revisit
the estimation in Table 10. My rst approach is to simply add the outside dummy to the
list of explanatory variables. If a retired CEO holds at least one outside directorship 2
years after retirement, the outside dummy takes value 1. The coe¢ cient on the outside
dummy is signicantly negative in the 1998-2002 sample (See the coe¢ cient of outside
in Table 11 ).21 The probability of serving as a chairman or inside director on ones own
20Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) explain why market performance during the nal years is highly
correlated with the probability of taking a charimanship or inside directorship for the following: "the
CEOs rm will want to provide incentives to the CEO in his last years, even though his ability is well
known. One possible incentive mechanism is an implict contract to retain the CEO on the board if stock-
market performance is good in the nal years. Since stock returns capture the long-run implications of a
CEOs decisions, we would expect rms to weight stock returns more heavily than unexpected accounting
performance in the CEOs nal years." ( Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999), page 371)
21 I also test whether serving as a chairman/inside director on their own boards would have a negative
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board increases by 21% given a discrete change in the outside directorship dummy in the
1989-1993 sample, compared to a 33% decrease in the 1998-2002 sample22.
There may be, however, an endogeneity problem in this specication. Whether a
retired CEO takes a chairman position on his own board or not may a¤ect the number of
outside directorships held by him. For that reason, I use two-stage least square estimation
to check the cross-e¤ect. The instrument for the outside dummy is the regulation dummy.
The results are reported in Table 12. The pre-retirement performance and rm-size
(LnAsset) are assumed to have e¤ects on both the probability of serving as outside
directors and as a chairman after retirement. The outside directorship dummy has a
signicantly negative e¤ect on the probability of serving as a chairman or inside director
2 years after retirement in the 1998-2002 sample. For instance, a 14% increase in the
predicted probability of holding at least one outside director produces a 15.2% decrease
in the probability of a retired CEOs serving as a chairman or inside director on his own
boards 2 years after retirement.
6 Discussion for accounting performance
I nd that the likelihood of serving as an outside director on the boards 2 years after
retirement is not related to a CEOs performance over his last four years in o¢ ce in the
1998-2002 sample, which is not consistent with the 1989-1993 sample. I used Return
on asset (ROA) and industry adjusted ROA for performance variables, just as Brickley,
Linck and Coles (1999) did. I have two suspects which could explain this puzzle. First,
the career opportunities for the talented CEOs after retirement might have risen over
time. In this case, we need to take into account other job positions after retirement to
precisely measure the e¤ect of pre-retirement performances23. Second, rms increasingly
put a more weight on the general skills rather than rm-specic skills when they select
e¤ect on the outside directorships or not. Similarly, I add the chairman/insider dummy to the estimations
in Table 5. The negative relationship exists only in the 1998-2002 sample. However, the two-stage least
square estimation in Table 12 shows that serving as a chairman/inside director does not have an e¤ect
on the probability of holding outside directorships in the 1998-2002 sample.
22This is based on specication (2) in Table 11.
23We can easily observe that many CEOs have several job positions after retirement except outside
directorships (community board, goverment organization, o¢ cer in private rms, consultant and so on).
Also, Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) show that 56% of outside directors declined an o¤er to
serve on boards, with a lack of time as their reason for refusal. However, there is no clue that a time
trend in the career opportunities exists.
12
board members. One of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)s potential explanations for the
strong relationship between the accounting returns and the number of outside director-
ship is that the accounting performance might reect talented CEOs ability under the
condition that the CEOs skills are specic to the rm because the rm could share the
di¤erence between CEOs value to the rm and his next highest-value. In this sense, if
the rm increasingly requires the general skills to outside board members, the accounting
performances might be less important in the selection of outside directors.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study what has happened to the choice of retired CEOs as board members
over time. For that purpose, I analyze directorships held in the two years after retirement
by 277 CEOs who left o¢ ces during 1989-1993 and 250 CEOs during 1998-2002. First,
retired CEOs became more common on boards. Second, the pre-retirement accounting
performance is highly correlated with the number of outside directorships in the 1989-
1993 sample. In contrast, this relationship vanishes in the 1998-2002 sample. Third,
a stock price performance (abnormal stock return) explains the probability of CEOs
serving as chairmen or insider directors on their own boards in both time periods, but the
e¤ect became much larger. Finally, the negative e¤ect of working in regulated industries
decreases during 1998-2002.
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Table 1 Sample distribution by industry 
(1) Industry is classified by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Those are 
obtained from Compustat data base  
(2) Number of observation (N) represents the number of retired CEO who came from each 
industry  
(3) The 1989-1993 sample and 1998-2002 sample include some other industries which are 
not shown in this table. Those industries have small proportions in full sample 
(4) % is the percentage in full sample 
(5) The distribution of Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999)’s data set (1989-1993 sample) is in 
parenthesis 
 
Industry SIC N % 
Food 20 8(11) 3.2(4.0) 
    
Chemical 28 21(20) 8.4(7.3)   
    
Machinery 
& Equipment 
35 19(13) 7.6(4.7) 
    
Electric, other electric equipment 36 6(7) 2.4(2.5) 
    
Transportation Equipment 37 11(11) 4.4(4.0) 
    
Instrument, Device 38 14(8) 5.6(2.9) 
    
Utility 49 10(37) 4.0(13.4) 
    
Retails Store(General Merchandise Store) 53 7(8) 2.8(2.9) 
    
Retail store 59 8(2) 3.2(0.7) 
    
Depository Institution 60 21(61) 8.4(22.1) 
    
Insurance 63 15(19) 6.0(6.9) 
    
Service 73 18(1) 7.2(0.36) 
    




Table 2 CEO and Firm characteristics 
(1) Pre-retirement performance (%) represents 4 year average value  before retirement or averaged 
value over tenure as a CEO, whichever is less 
(2) Industry adjusted ROA  is the firm’s return minus the median 2 digit SIC industry return based on 
SIC code of Compustat 
(3) Abnormal stock return  is the compound average annual return minus the CRSP value weighted 
index 
(4) I provide results for difference in mean test (2- tailed test) between one sub-sample and 
complements: *, **and *** show that the mean level of one sub- sample is higher than that of 
complements at 1%,5% and 10% significant levels   
(5) The distribution  of  the 1989-1993 sample is in parenthesis 
 
 Full sample Retirement Age 60≥ 64≤Retirement Age≤66 
    
Number of observation 250(277) 165(198) 63(88) 
    
CEO’s characteristics    
    
Retirement Age 61 (61.2) 63.97(64.1) 64.51(64.4) 
    
Tenure as CEO 11.3 (9.6) 12.12(10.7) 13.02(10.6) 
    
Firms’ characteristics     
    
Total Asset ($ billion in 1997) 15.38(13.4) 18.35(13.7) 18.03(13.3) 
    
Pre-retirement performance    
    
Return on asset  5.31(3.3) 5.52(3.7**) 5.41(4.5***) 
    
Industry adjusted ROA  0.64 0.95 0.93 
    
Return on equity  15.11 16.63** 17.3 
    
Abnormal stock return  -2.6(-8.1) -1.84**(-4.0***) -1.82(-1.2***) 











Table 3 Mean number of directorships, Mean financial performance, stock price performance and asset 
by tenure as a CEO 
(1) Number of observation (N) represents the number of retired CEOs who have less than 5 tenure years, 10 
tenure years and 20 tenure years as a CEO  
(2) % is percentage in full sample 
(3) Chair +2 years > 0 stands for the number of retired CEOs who have a chairman or inside director position 2 
years after retirement in each category.  
(4) Outside + 2 years > 0 stands for the number of retired CEOs who have at least 1 outside directorships 2 
years after retirement in each group 
(5) Chair +2 years and Outside + 2 years are the mean number of chairman/ inside directorship and outside 
directorships retired CEOs have 2 years after retirement in each group 
(6) All financial and market  performance are the average over last four years in office or the CEO’s tenure, 
whichever is less 
(7) ROA is return on asset. Abnormal stock return (ABRET) is the compound average annual return minus the 
CRSP value weighted index 
(8) I provide results for difference in mean test (2-tailed test) within each sample: *, **and ***  show that the 
mean level of one group  is higher than that of complements at 1%,5% and 10% significant level 
(9) The distribution of the 1989-1993 sample is in parenthesis 
(10) All variables are mean level of each subsample 
 
 Tenure<5 otherwise Tenure<10 otherwise Tenure<20 otherwise 
N 32(82) 214(195) 119(174) 127(103) 216(246) 30(31) 
       
% 13.01(29.6) 86.99(70.4) 48.37(62.82) 51.63(37.18) 87.8(88.81) 12.2(11.19) 
       
Chair +2 
years > 0 15(34) 95(103) 45(76) 65(61) 88(116) 22(21) 
       
Outside + 2 
years > 0 24(45) 171(116) 101(111) 94(50) 177(146) 18(15) 
       
Chair +2 
years .47(.41) .44(.53**) .38(.44) .51**(.59***) .41(.47) .73***(.68**) 
       
Outside + 2 
years 1.72(1.07) 2.17*(1.4*) 2.29*(1.44**) 1.94(1.08) 2.17**(1.33**) 1.63(1.06) 
       
ROA 5.25(2.1) 5.39(3.78**) 5.11(3.1) 5.63(3.59) 5.09(3.18) 7.42**(4.1) 
       
ABRET -3.6(-13.1) -2.57(-5.97**) -3.53(-8.4) -1.92*(-.7.5) -2.98(-8.37) -0.71*(-5.94) 
       
Asset 7.84(12.82) 16.75(13.7) 18.17(14.93) 13.18(10.93) 16.45(14.5**) 9.41(5.07) 
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Table 4-A Post-retirement directorship  
(1) The first sub-sample includes CEOs who retired at 60 years old and older 
(2) The second sub-sample covers CEOs who left an office between aged 64 and 66   
(3) Chair +2 year>0 represents the number of retired CEOs who have a chairman or inside director 
position 2 years after retirement in the full sample and both sub-samples 
(4) Outside +2 year>0  represents the number of retired CEOs who have at least 1 outside 
directorship 2 years after retirement in the  full sample and both sub-samples 
(5) Outside +2 year is the number of outside directorships 
(6) Total +2 year>0 represents the number of retired CEOs who have at least 1 directorship 2 years 
after retirement in full sample and both sub-samples 
(7) Total +2 year is the number of total directorships 
(8) % is the percentage in the  full sample and both sub-samples 
(9) The distribution of the 1989-1993 sample is in parenthesis   
 
 Full sample  Age≥ 60  64≤Age≤ 66  
 N % N % N % 
        
Chair +2 year>0 113(137) 45.2(49.5) 78(113) 52.3(57.1) 31(61) 49.21(69.3) 
       
       
Outside +2 year>0  195(161) 78(58.1) 128(124) 77.58(62.6) 50(60) 79.37(68.2) 
       
Outside +2 year       
0 55(116) 22(41.88) 37(74) 22.42(37.37) 13(28) 20.63(31.82) 
       
1 50(58) 20(20.94) 32(45) 19.39(22.73) 9(18) 14.29(20.45) 
       
2 50(48) 20(17.33) 29(36) 17.58(18.18) 13(15) 20.63(17.05) 
       
3 42(28) 16.8(10.11) 28(19) 16.97(9.6) 10(11) 15.87(12.5) 
       
4 or more  53(27) 21.2(9.75) 39(24) 23.64(12.12) 18(16) 28.57(18.18) 
       
        
Total +2 year>0 236(208) 94.4(75.1) 156(162) 94.55(81.8) 58(77) 92.06(87.5) 
       
Total +2 year       
0 14(69) 5.6(24.9) 9(36) 5.45(18.2) 5(11) 7.94(12.5) 
       
1 64(76) 25.6(27.4) 40(56) 24.24(28.3) 9(21) 14.29(23.86) 
       
2 57(48) 22.8(17.3) 38(39) 23.03(19.7) 14(19) 22.22(21.59) 
       
3 52(41) 20.8(14.8) 32(32) 19.39(16.2) 14(12) 22.22(13.64) 
       
4 or more  63(43) 25.2(15.5) 46(35) 27.89(17.7) 21(25) 33.34(28.41) 
       




Table 4-B Mean difference between the 1989-1993 sample and the 1998-2002 sample 
(1) I provide results for difference in mean test (2- tailed test) between the 1989-1993 sample and the 
1998-2002 samples: *, **and *** show that the mean level of the 1998-2002 sample is higher 
than that of the 1989-1993 sample  at 1%,5% and 10% significant levels   
 
   
Sample period 1989-1993 1998-2002 
   
Number of observation 277 250 
   
Outside  +2 years 1.30 2.08*** 
   
Chair  +2 years 0.49 0.45 
   
Total +2 years 1.8 2.52*** 
   
Return on asset 3.29 5.32*** 
   
Abnormal stock return -8.1 -2.5*** 
   
Tenure as CEOs 9.59 11.3*** 
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Table 5 Probability of serving as outside directors 2 years after retirement (Ordered logit)  
(1) The dependent variable: the number of outside directorships 2years after retirement  
(2) The classes are 0,1,2,3,4+ outside directorships 
(3) Control variables are the natural log of 1997 years asset (LnAsset), and a regulation dummy 
(Regulated dummy) which takes the value 1 if the firm is a utility, bank or insurance company 
(4) The outcome of the 1989-1993 sample  is in parenthesis  
(5) *** , **and *  represent 1%,  5% and 10% significant levels  
(6) I do not have “Industry adjusted ROA” for the 1989-1993 sample 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Return on asset -.74  (5.26**) 
  .36 
(5.58**) 
     
Industry adjusted ROA  -1.14   
     
Abnormal stock return   -3.04** (0.28) 
-3.1** 
(-0.16) 
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Table 6 Mean difference between regulated industries and non-regulated ones  
(1) Number of observation represents the number of retired CEOs from non-regulated and 
regulated sectors   
(2) Mean value for 1989-1993 sample is in parenthesis.  
(3) Outside +2 years represents the mean level of outside directorships retired CEOs have 2 
years after retirement in each group   
(4) I provide results for difference in mean test (2-tailed test) between non-regulated and 
regulated sectors in the 1989-1993 sample and the 1998-2002 sample 
(5) The result for Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value) is in the last column of table: the value in 
parenthesis is the p-value for the 1989-1993 sample 
(6) I do not have “Industry adjusted ROA” and ‘Return on equity” for the 1989-1993 sample 
 
 Non-regulated firms Regulated firms p-value  
Number of observation 204(160) 46(117)  
    
Outside  +2 years 2.12(1.73***) 1.89(0.73) 0.324(0.00) 
    
Performance measure    
    
Return on asset 6***(4.6***) 2(1.4) 0.00(0.00) 
    
Industry adjusted ROA 0.8 0.1 0.046 
    
Return on equity 16 12 0.008 
    
Abnormal stock return  -.2.8(-6*) -16(-11) 0.4435(0.59) 
    
Other characteristic    
    
Asset  9.88(14.16) 39.79***(12.45) 0.00(0.00) 
    
Tenure as CEO 11.06(10.32**) 12.41(8.59) 0.0997(0.18) 
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Table 7-A Mean difference in regulated industries between two time periods (1989-
1993 and 1998-2002) 
(1) Number of observations represents the number of retired CEOs who came from regulated 
sectors 
(2) Outside +2 years represents the mean level of outside directorships retired CEOs from 
regulated sectors have 2 years after retirement in 1989-1993 sample and 1998-2002 
sample 
(3) I provide results for difference in mean test (2 tailed test) between the 1998-2002 sample 
and the 1989-1993 sample: *** represents 1% significant level 
(4) The result for Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value) is in the table 
 
    p-value  
 Year 1989-1993 1998-2002  
     
Utility Number of observations 37 10  
     
 Outside +2 years 0.89 2.2*** 0.0046 
     
depository institution  Number of observations 61 21  
     
 Outside +2 years 0.66 1.71*** 0.067 
     
Insurance  Number of observations 19 15  
     
 Outside +2 years 0.63 1.93*** 0.011 
     
Total  Number of observation 117 46  
     
 Outside +2 years 0.73 1.89*** 0.00 
     
 
Table 7-B Mean difference in financial sector between two time periods  
 
Financial sectors(60,61,62,63)   p-value  
Year 1989-1993 1998-2002  
    
Number of observation 88 39  
    
Outside +2 years 0.8 1.82*** 0.00 
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Table 8 Probability of serving as outside directors 2 years after retirement: Industry specific 
effect (Ordered logit model)  
(1)  The dependent variable: the number of outside directorships 2years after retirement  
(2)   The classes are 0,1,2,3,4 
(3) The Financial industry dummy which takes the value 1 if the firm is a depository institution (SIC 
code 60), non-depository credit institution (SIC code 61), security and commodity brokers, 
dealers, exchanges, and services company (SIC code 62), and insurance (SIC code 63)  
(4) The estimation in parenthesis is based on the 1989-1993 sample 
(5)  *** , **and *  represent 1%,  5% and 10% significant levels  
 
 1 2 
Return on asset .21(5.95**) -.37(5.04*) 
   
Abnormal stock return -2.75*(-.22) -2.58*(-.10) 
   
LnAsset .63***(.69***) .68***(.69***) 
   
Industry dummy   
   
Financial industry -1.49***(-1.47***)  
   
Food    -.12(.3) 
   
Chemical product  .14(.89**) 
   
Machinery & equipment  1.37***(.85)  
   
Transportation  -.041(-.59) 
   
Utility  -.63(-.86**) 
   
General merchandise store  -1.54*(.66) 
   
Depository Institution  -1.88***(-1.6***) 
   
Insurance   -1.1**(-1.59***) 
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Table 9 Mean financial performance, stock price performance and assets by whether a 
CEO serves as a chairman or inside director 2 years after leaving office or not  
(1) Chair +2 takes value 1 if retired CEOs serve a chairman or inside director on their own 
boards 2 years after retirement. Otherwise, 0  
(2) I provide results for difference-in-mean test (2tailed test) within each sample: *, **and 
***  show that the mean level of one group is higher than that of complements at 1%,5% 
and 10% significant levels in the full sample and both sub-samples. 
(3) I also provide p-value for Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value) 
(4) All values are mean values  
(5) The distribution of the 1989-1993 sample is in parenthesis 
 
 Full sample  
Chair + 2years 0 1 
   
Number of observation 137 (140) 
113 
(137) 
   
Return on asset 5.25 (2.3) 
5.4 
(4.3***) 
   
Industry adjusted ROA 0.51 (0.2) 
0.79 
(1.8) 
   
 Return on equity 16.17 13.84 
   
Abnormal stock return -4.8 (-13.5) 
0.05*** 
(-2.6***) 
   
Assets 19.8*** 10.03 
   
Tenure as CEO 9.71 (8.26) 
13.27*** 
(10.95***) 
   
 p-value  
   
Return on asset 0.23 (0.00)  
   
Industry adjusted ROA 0.015 (0.00)  
   
Return on equity 0.75  
   
Abnormal stock return 0.00 (0.00)  
   
Assets 0.00  




Table 10 Probability of CEOs’ serving as chairmen or inside directors on their own boards 2 
years after retirement (Logit model)  
(1) The dependent variable: if retired CEOs serve as chairmen or inside directors on their own board 
2 years after retirement value 1 is assigned and vice versa  
(2) The financial and stock price performance are the average over last four years in office or the 
CEO’s tenure, whichever is less 
(3) Abnormal stock return is the compound average annual return minus the CRSP value weighted 
index   
(4) Control variables are the natural log of 1997 years asset (LnAsset), tenure as CEO (Tenure as 
CEO),  regulation dummy (Reg) which takes the value 1 if the firm is a utility, depository institution or 
insurance company 
       (5) Tenure ( 20years) takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is longer than 19 years. Otherwise 0 ≥
(6) Tenure (≥ 10 years) takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is longer than 9 years. Otherwise 0 
(7) The outcome for the 1989-1993 sample is in parenthesis.  
















     





     







     
Tenure as CEO .06*** (.04**) 
.07*** 
(0.04**)   
     
Tenure 
(≥ 20years)   1.22*** (.76*)  
     
Tenure ( 10 
years) 
≥    .37 (.64**) 
     







     











Table 11 Probability of CEOs’ serving as Chairmen or inside directors on their own 
boards 2 years after retirement (Logit model)  
(1)The dependent variable: if retired CEOs serve as chairmen or insider directors 2 years 
after retirement value 1 is assigned and vice versa  
(2) The financial and stock price performance is the average over the last four years in office 
or the CEO’s tenure, whichever is less 
(3) Abnormal stock return is the compound average annual return minus the CRSP value 
weighted index  
(4) Control variables are the natural log of 1997 years asset (LnAsset), tenure year as a 
CEO, and a regulation dummy (Reg) which takes the value 1 if the firm is a utility, bank or 
insurance company 
(5) Outside dummy (Outside) is equal to 1 if the retired CEO has at least 1 outside 
directorship. Otherwise, 0   
(6) The outcome for the 1989-1993 sample is in parenthesis 
      (7)  *** , **and *  represent 1%,  5% and 10% significant levels  
 
Logit  1 2 3 
    





    
Return on asset   -6.64* (2.39) 
    
LnAsset  -.3* (-.25**) 
-.38*** 
(-.23**) 
    





    





    











Table 12 Probability of CEOs’ serving as outside directors and Chairmen/inside directors on 
their own boards 2 years after retirement: 2SLS  
 





Constant 0.98 4.43*** 
   
Chair   
   
Outside 0.72 -4.42** 
   
Return on asset 2.59 -.04 
   
Abnormal stock return 1.6*** 7.29*** 
   
Tenure as CEO .04** .04 
   
LnAsset -.21 -.15 
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